In this paper, we investigate whether there is a pollution haven e¤ect, speci…cally, the e¤ect of environmental regulations on …rm location. Our identi…cation uses the Two Control Zones (TCZ) policy implemented by the Chinese government in 1998. The di¤erence-indi¤erences (DID) estimation shows that cities with tougher environmental regulations attract less foreign direct investment (FDI). Specifically, being listed as a TCZ city causes the amount of FDI to drop by 41%. Our results are robust to various robustness checks on the validity of the DID estimation and other estimation concerns.
Introduction
Extreme weather prevails worldwide, causing not only tremendous economic losses but also signi…cant human casualties. For example, in 2011 the U.S. had a record twelve weather disasters that cost more than $1 billion, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 1 Environmental damage is widely blamed for such severe weather. Concerned about the further deterioration of living environments, governments across the world are strengthening their regulations on pollution with the hope that …rms will develop greener technologies and produce more environmentally responsible goods. An unintended consequence, however, is that …rms may respond by reallocating production to places with less stringent environmental regulations, a phenomenon known as the pollution haven e¤ect. This may not only counteract the e¤ects of environmental policies, but also worsen the overall scenario. For example, developing countries may manipulate their environmental policies to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI), which could lead to an increase in the overall pollution levels.
Despite much anecdotal evidence, however, empirical studies fail to provide conclusive …ndings on the pollution haven e¤ect. Some studies …nd no such e¤ect, 2 while others detect the e¤ect of environmental regulations on the location choice of …rms. 3 As a result, the investigation on the pollution haven e¤ect is considered to be "one of the most contentious issues in the debate regarding international trade, foreign investment, and the environment" (Kellenberg, 2009 ).
An inherent empirical challenge to …nding the pollution haven e¤ect is how to deal with the potential endogeneity of environmental regulations. Much of the existing literature treats environmental regulations as exogenous (see Levinson, 2008 for a survey). Some recent studies start to tackle the potential endogeneity of environmental regulations, for example, by using either the instrumental variable approach (see Millimet and Roy, 2011 , for a survey) or the propensity score matching method (List, Millimet, Fredriksson, and McHone, 2003) . However, both the instrumental variable estimation and the propensity score matching method require strong identi…cation assumptions. For the former, instrumental variables must be exogenous, whereas for the 1 For more information, see "2011 Breaks Record For Most Billion-Dollar Weather Disasters" by Eyder Peralta at National Public Radio, December 7, 2011. 2 For example, Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman (1992); Levinson (1996) ; Becker and Henderson (2000) ; Eskeland and Harrison (2003) ; Javorcik and Wei (2004) . 3 For example, Henderson (1996) latter, both observables and unobservables must be matched.
We examine whether there is a pollution haven e¤ect by using a change in environmental regulations, i.e., the implementation of the Two Control Zones (TCZ) policy in China, as an experiment (for details about environmental regulations in China, see Section 2). 4 Speci…cally, we explore two variations, time (before and after the policy change) and cross-sectional (some cities had the new environmental policy (treatment group), and others did not (control group)), to conduct a di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) analysis. Our DID estimation shows that cities with tougher environmental regulation attract less FDI, which con…rms the pollution haven e¤ect. Meanwhile, the magnitude of the pollution haven e¤ect is found to be large: strengthening environmental regulations causes the amount of FDI to drop by around 41%.
The validity of our DID estimation hinges on the condition that the treatment group would have followed the trend of the control group in attracting FDI if they had not implemented the new environmental policy. To verify the satisfaction of this identi…cation assumption, we conduct a series of sensitivity analyses, including checking any di¤erential pre-treatment time trends, including city-speci…c time trend, using two alternative control groups, controlling for provincial factors and spatial correlation, and conducting a placebo test, falsi…cation tests, and an instrumental variable estimation. Our …ndings on the pollution haven e¤ect remain robust to all of these validity checks.
In addition to the change in the environmental policy, China provides an ideal setting for investigating the pollution haven e¤ect. On the one hand, since it adopted the open and reform policy in 1978, Chinese governments have been aggressively attracting FDI, which has made China the largest FDI recipient country in the world. On the other hand, China's fast economic growth in recent decades has been accompanied by severe environmental degeneration, such as over-exploration and mass industrial pollution, which are typical problems in developing countries. Meanwhile, China is a large country with substantial di¤erences in the FDI distribution and environmental quality across regions, which provides us with enough variations to identify the pollution haven e¤ect.
Our study is similar to and complements the work of Hanna (2011) , who also uses a DID analysis to investigate how tough environmental regulations in the U.S. a¤ect its out ‡ow FDI. Whereas Hanna (2011) looks at the U.S., the largest developed country in the world, we use data from China, the largest developing country in the world. Meanwhile, we investigate how environmental regulations a¤ect the amount of FDI a city receives (or the FDI recipient side), whereas Hanna (2011) examines whether U.S. multinationals reallocate their production to foreign countries in response to domestic environmental regulations (or the FDI sourcing side).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The institutional background of environmental regulations in China is described in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the estimation framework of the pollution haven e¤ect, along with a number of robustness checks on the identi…cation assumption. Data and variables are described in Section 4, and empirical …ndings are reported in Section 5. The paper concludes with Section 6.
Institutional Background of Environmental Regulations in China
The SO2 emissions generated by coal combustion have increased substantially alongside the fast economic growth in China in past decades. National coal consumption in 1990 was 1.05 billion tons and increased to 1.28 billion in 1995. In 1993, 62.3% cities in China had annual average ambient SO2 concentration values above the national Class II standard. In Chongqing, the annual ambient SO2 concentration reached 270 or 4.5 times the national Class II standard. Around the same period, 40% of the national territory reported acid rain with average PH value lower than 5.6. SO2 and acid rain may hurt human health and destroy ecosystems, which may consequently impede economic growth. Concerned with its long-term sustainable economic development, Chinese governments started to tackle air pollution issues in the mid 1980s by implementing a series of regulatory policies. The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China (APPCL) was enacted in 1987 and executed in 1988. This new environmental law provided general principles of regulation for air pollution for local governments and related agencies. However, the APPCL was considered very sketchy. For example, it did not present any concrete policies on how to control SO2 emissions or specify which government body should be responsible for enforcing the policies. As a result, the e¤ect of the regulation on air pollution was limited, with SO2 emissions and acid rain continuing to increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
With a growing concern over the air pollution problem, Chinese governments decided to take more stringent measures. In 1995, the 1987 APPCL was amended, and one chapter about the regulation on air pollution and SO2 emissions was included. More importantly, a new policy, namely the Two Control Zones (TCZ) policy, was proposed to prevent the air quality of those heavily-polluted areas from deteriorating further.
The two control zones include SO2 pollution control zones and acid rain control zones. The National Environmental Protection Bureau (NEPB) began designating cities as TCZ in late 1995, based on several criteria. Speci…-cally, a city was designated as a SO2 pollution control zone if: (1) its average annual ambient SO2 concentration was larger than the national Class II standard (i.e., 0.06 mg/m3) in recent years; (2) its daily average ambient SO2 concentrations exceeded the national Class III standard (i.e., 0.25 mg/m3); or (3) its SO2 emissions were signi…cant. And a city was designated as an acid rain control zone if: (1) its average PH value of precipitation was equal or smaller than 4.5; (2) its sulfate deposition was above the critical load; or (3) its SO2 emissions were large.
In 1997, "The Request for Approval of the Proposal of Designation for Acid Rain Control Areas and SO2 Pollution Control Areas" was issued by NEPB and sent to State Council for approval. In January 1998, this proposal was approved by the State Council in the document "The O¢cial Reply of the State Council Concerning Acid Rain Control Areas and SO2 Pollution Control Areas". It was then put into e¤ect. Among a total of 380 cities, 175 cities were designated as TCZ. Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of TCZ cities in China. In general, SO2 pollution control zones are located in northern China because of the heating system, whereas acid rain control zones are located in southern China where the climate is relatively more humid.
Once a city was designated as TCZ, tougher regulatory policies were implemented. For example, according to the amendment, if new thermal power plants, medium or large …rms with serious SO2 emissions were to be built in these zones, desulfurization, dust-collecting facilities and other required equipment must be installed. For the existing SO2-emitting plants, SO2-reducing and dust-collecting measures must be taken.
In the 1998 approval document for the TCZ list, the State council also laid out the targets for environmental control in TCZ cities in the short run (2000) and in the long run (2010). Speci…cally, for 2000, "the sources of industrial SO2 pollution should achieve the national standard of discharging SO2. The total amount of SO2 emission should be within the required amount. Ambient SO2 concentrations in important cities should achieve the national standards. The acid rain in the acid rain control areas should be alleviated." For 2010, "the total amount of SO2 emission should be lower than that of 2000. Ambient SO2 concentrations in all cities should achieve the national standards. The number of acid rain areas with average PH value of precipitation equal or smaller than 4.5 should be reduced signi…cantly."
These new environmental regulations have generated signi…cant improve- 
Estimation Strategy
In this section, we …rst lay out our estimation framework for the pollution haven e¤ect and then discuss the various checks on our identi…cation assumption.
Estimation Framework
To illustrate our identi…cation strategy for the pollution haven e¤ect, we adopt the Rubin causal model. Assume that for city c at time t we can observe two potential outcomes, Y ct (1) and Y ct (0), where Y ct represents our outcome variable, the logarithm of the amount of FDI. Y ct (1) denotes the value when there is an extremely stringent environmental regulation and hence the value is determined by economic factors X ct as well as city timeinvariant factors ( c ) and yearly common shocks ( t ), i.e.,
Y ct (0) denotes the value when there is no environmental regulation, i.e.,
where > 0 captures the pollution haven e¤ect; that is, the e¤ect of environmental regulation on the location choice of FDI.
With these two outcome values (Y ct (1) and Y ct (0)), we can readily calculate the pollution haven e¤ect as
However, in observational data like ours, we are only able to observe one of the two potential outcome values: either Y ct (1) or Y ct (0). This makes identi…cation of the pollution haven e¤ect through equation (3) infeasible. To retrieve the pollution haven e¤ect, we exploit the TCZ policy that was put into e¤ect in 1998 in China as a natural experiment to conduct a DID analysis.
Speci…cally, there are two groups of cities, the treatment and control groups. The treatment group comprises cities designated as TCZ in 1998 (or TCZ cities), whereas the control group includes cities not designated as TCZ in 1998 (or non-TCZ cities). Denote the indicator of the treatment status T CZ c as
Our DID estimator is
where
Equation (6) represents our identi…cation assumption, which states that the treatment group would have followed the trend of the control group in attracting FDI if they had not implemented the new environmental policy. As long as our identi…cation assumption is satis…ed (i.e., IA = 0), our DID estimator recovers the true pollution haven e¤ect, i.e., DID = . 5 In regression form, our baseline DID estimation has the following speci…-cation
where t is the time dummy, capturing those factors common to all cities at time t; c is the city dummy, capturing city c's all time-invariant characteristics; P ost c indicates the post-treatment period, i.e.,
and " ct is the error term. To deal with potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we cluster the standard errors at the city level, following Bertrand, Du ‡o, and Mullainathan (2004).
Checks on the Identi…cation Assumption
Our identi…cation assumption in regression form (corresponding to equation (6)) is
It is reasonable to believe that this identi…cation assumption holds in our setting, because the initiation of the TCZ policy was exogenous to local governments. Meanwhile, the designation of TCZ cities was based on several criteria, in particular past ambient SO2 concentration values and the PH of precipitation, and speci…c threshold levels, all of which could not be manipulated by city governments. Nonetheless, we discuss in the following a series of robustness checks on the identi…cation assumption (9). Pre-treatment di¤erential time trends. One way to check whether the identi…cation assumption (9) holds is to examine whether the assumption is satis…ed several years before the treatment, i.e.,
A …nding of IA s = 0 8s 1 may imply that our identi…cation assumption (9) continues to hold. The corresponding regression speci…cation is
and the test of s = 08s 1 corresponds to the check of IA s = 0 8s 1.
City-speci…c time trend. Cities in the treatment and control groups may follow di¤erent time trends, which may then compound our DID estimate. To address this concern, we allow for city-speci…c time trend in our DID estimation. Speci…cally, the …rst-di¤erenced error term in estimation equation (7) is decomposed as
and our identi…cation assumption (9) is relaxed as
The corresponding new regression speci…cation is
Matched control group. Instead of using arbitrary, non-TCZ cities as the control group, we match each city in the treatment group with a city in the control group based on a number of average pre-treatment city characteristics W c1992 1997 , following List, Millimet, Fredriksson, and McHone (2003) and Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009). Speci…cally, we …rst estimate a Probit regression, i.e.,
Based on the predicted probability^ c , we then match each TCZ city with a non-TCZ city that has the closest value of^ c compared to the concerned TCZ city. Using this matched control group, we relax our identi…cation assumption (9) as
Meanwhile, if conditional on X ct our treatment and control groups in the baseline estimation (7) are already balanced, then the use of this matched control group should barely change the statistical signi…cance and the magnitude of our baseline DID estimate, i.e., Matched = Baseline . Surrounding non-TCZ cities as the control group. We construct another alternative control group, speci…cally, all of the non-TCZ cities that surround a TCZ city. Because neighboring cities tend to have similar economic, social, and climate conditions, the use of this alternative control group may improve the comparability between the treatment and control groups. Meanwhile, we also compare the estimated magnitude from this alternative control group to that of the baseline estimator as a check on whether the treatment and control groups are indeed balanced in the baseline estimation, or the satisfaction of the identi…cation assumption (9) .
Provincial factors and spatial correlation. Chinese provinces usually have di¤erent regional policies and guidelines for policy enforcement that could potentially bias our estimate. To address this concern, we allow for any arbitrary (time-varying or time-invariant) provincial compounding factors by including province-time dummies. Meanwhile, the inclusion of province-time dummies provides us with a control for the spatial correlation issues pointed out by Drukker and Millimet (2008) . The estimation speci…cation with the inclusion of the province-time dummies is
where pt is the province-time dummy, capturing all provincial time-invariant and time-varying characteristics, and the corresponding identi…cation assumption is
Placebo test: an arti…cial date of treatment. The NEPB began compiling the TCZ list in late 1995; hence, introducing concerns about whether there is any expectation e¤ect, that is, the e¤ect of environmental regulation on FDI happened before the e¤ective date of the policy. As a robustness check, we conduct a placebo test, that is, using 1996 instead of 1998 as the time of treatment. Hence, our new DID estimator is
A …nding of~ DID = 0 may not only dismiss concerns of an expectation e¤ect, but also show that the treatment and control groups followed similar time trends before the policy change in 1998. Falsi…cation tests. Instead of looking at FDI as the outcome variable, we examine other outcome variables Z ct that are supposed to be una¤ected by the change in environmental regulations. Hence, the DID estimator of Z k ct
where z k = 0; and
A …nding of z k DID = 08k means that the treatment and control groups are balanced for these alternative outcome variables Z k ct (i.e., IA z k = 08k), which may imply the satisfaction of our baseline identi…cation assumption (9) . To choose these alternative outcome variables Z ct , we use the number of buses, the number of bus passengers, the number of middle schools, the number of primary schools, the primary school enrolment numbers, and road area, all in logarithm form.
Instrumental variable estimation. The TCZ assignment was based on the criteria listed in Section 2, which creates a discontinuity in the assignment variable. By exploring such discontinuity, we can construct a possibly exogenous instrument for TCZ status. Speci…cally, the instrumental variable is constructed as
where I [:] is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the argument in the bracket is true and 0 if false; M c95 is the average annual ambient SO2 concentration in 1995 for the northern cities and the average PH value of precipitation in 1995 for the southern cities; 6 and m 0 is 0.06mg/m 3 for the northern cities and 4.5 for the southern cities. The …rst-stage of the instrumental variable estimation is
and the second-stage is
The inclusion of M c95 P ost t suggests that the identi…cation of the instrumental variable estimation comes from discontinuity in the distribution of the assignment variable M c95 , i.e., the identi…cation assumption of the instrumental variable estimation is
It is reasonable to believe that the identi…cation assumption (25) is satis…ed, because the assignment was based on past pollutant emission values and speci…c threshold levels. However, the implementation of this instrumental variable estimation faces two data challenges. First, we do not have information about the PH values of precipitation. Our remedy is to use the average annual ambient SO2 concentration to replace the PH value for southern cities, because the dissolution of SO2 in water reduces the PH value and generates acid rain, and the assignment should be comparable across northern and southern cities. Second, information of average annual ambient SO2 concentrations is only available for around 80 cities, about 30% of the whole sample. This severe sample attrition is expected to substantially increase the standard error and hence reduce the statistical signi…cance of our estimated coe¢cient. As a result, we also report the Dubin-Wu-Hausman test, which checks the statistical equivalence between our DID and instrumented DID estimates, or the equivalence of identi…cation assumptions (9) and (25).
Data and Variables
The data used in this study come from the following three sources: From the …rst data source, we collect information about our outcome variable, the amount of FDI, for each city during the 1992-2009 period. The …rst data source also provides information about our control variables X ct , including the number of college students, the number of high school students, the number of telephones, GDP, the number of taxis, population, the number of road areas, industrial production, and the number of retail consumptions. To construct the matched control group, we further collect information about total wages and tax revenue. For a detailed description of these variables, see Appendix 1.
From the second data source, we obtain information about the annual average ambient SO2 concentrations. The SO2 concentration statistics come from the records of many monitoring stations in a few cities, the number of which has steadily increased over time. For example, there were only 65 cities with records of pollution in 1992, whereas in 2003 that number rose to 113. To construct the instrumental variable, we use information from 1995, which contains information on the value of the annual average ambient SO2 concentrations for 80 cities.
The third data source provides us with a detailed name list of cities designated as TCZ. During our sample period (1992-2009), the composition of this list remained unchanged. Appendix 2 supplies this list of these TCZ cities. Among a total of 280 cities for which the Chinese City Statistical Yearbook has information, 158 are TCZ cities. Figure 3 shows the time trends of the logarithm of the total amount of FDI in TCZ and non-TCZ cities during the 1992-2009 period. In general, TCZ cities attracted more FDI than non-TCZ cities. Meanwhile, both groups exhibited an upward trend in the amount of FDI in this time period, which re ‡ects the e¤ects of China's open and reform policy and rapid economic growth. More interestingly, before 1998 (the time of the TCZ policy became e¤ective), TCZ and non-TCZ cities had similar time trends, except for a sudden drop in 1997 for non-TCZ cities. After the implementation of the TCZ policy, the growth of FDI in TCZ cities slowed while that in non-TCZ cities caught up. At the end of the sample period (i.e., 2009), the gap in the amount of FDI between these two groups was much smaller than it had been at the beginning of the sample period (i.e., 1992).
Empirical Findings

Baseline Result
Our baseline DID estimation results corresponding to equation (7) are reported in Table 1 . The DID estimator DID (i.e., the estimated coe¢cient of the interaction between the indicator of the treatment status T CZ and that of the post-treatment period P ost it ) is found to be negative and statistically signi…cant. This result implies that cities with tougher environmental reg-ulations (i.e., the TCZ policy) attract fewer FDI, con…rming the pollution haven e¤ect.
Meanwhile, the economic magnitude of the pollution haven e¤ect is also signi…cant. The implementation of the TCZ policy causes the amount of FDI to drop by 41:1%. This magnitude is larger than those found in the literature. For example, Henderson (1996) The estimated coe¢cients of other economic determinants of FDI also make economic sense. Better telecommunication infrastructure (i.e., the number of telephones) attracts foreign investment and cities with more domestic production accommodate more FDI, which supports the agglomeration theories. Moreover, foreign …rms are more likely to locate in cities with larger domestic consumption.
Checks on the Identi…cation Assumption of the DID Estimation
Whether our DID estimator in Table 2 captures the true pollution haven e¤ect hinges on the satisfaction of our identi…cation assumption (9), i.e., IA = 0 , DID = . In this sub-section, we present the results of a series of robustness checks, as illustrated in Section 3.2, on the identi…cation assumption of our DID estimation. First, Column 1 of Table 2 reports the estimation results regarding the check on any di¤erential pre-treatment time trends according to equation (11) . Neither T CZ P rior1 (an indicator of one year before the treatment) nor T CZ P rior2 (an indicator of two years before the treatment) has any statistical signi…cance. These …ndings suggest that the treatment and control groups have similar time trends (at least) two years before the treatment, which implies that the treatment group may follow the same trend as the control group in the case of no treatment or the satisfaction of our identi…cation assumption (9) .
Second, we include city-speci…c time trend in Column 2 of Table 2 . It is found that our DID estimate of the pollution haven e¤ect remains statistically signi…cant. Despite an increase in the estimated magnitude, the Hausman test shows that the DID estimate with the inclusion of the city-speci…c time trend is statistically indi¤erent from the baseline DID estimate in Table 2 .
Third, we use the propensity score matching method to match each TCZ city with a non-TCZ city. Speci…cally, for the matching covariates, we follow List, Millimet, Fredriksson, and McHone (2003) and Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009) by using total wage, population, GDP, the number of college students, the number of high school students, the number of telephones, road area per capita, tax revenue, and industrial production. The balancing tests reported in Appendix 3 show that after the matching, the treatment and control groups are balanced in all of these covariates. Estimation results using the matched control group are reported in Column 3 of Table 2 ; such that the estimator remains statistically signi…cant. Meanwhile, although the estimated magnitude falls to 0:343, the Hausman test shows that it is statistically indi¤erent from the baseline DID estimate ( 0:411 in Table 1 ). These results imply that the treatment and control groups are balanced in the baseline DID estimation, which lends support to the satisfaction of our identi…cation assumption (9) .
Fourth, we use the non-TCZ cities that surround each TCZ city as an alternative control group. Appendix 2 reports this list for each of the TCZ cities. Estimation results are reported in Column 4 of Table 2 . It is found that the new DID estimate resembles the baseline DID estimate in Table 1 , in both statistical signi…cance and magnitude. These results further verify the use of the control group in the baseline DID estimation or the satisfaction of our identi…cation assumption (9) .
Fifth, we include province-time dummies in Column 5 of Table 2 to control for any arbitrary provincial time-varying and time-invariant compounding factors and spatial correlation. Clearly, our …ndings on the pollution haven e¤ect remain robust to the inclusion of province-time dummies.
Sixth, as a placebo test, we use 1996 as the time of treatment instead of the real e¤ective date, 1998. If there is no expectation e¤ect and the treatment and control groups are comparable before the treatment, then the DID estimate using 1996 as the time of treatment should not produce any statistical signi…cance. Indeed, we …nd that it is statistically insigni…cant (Column 6 of Table 2 ), which reinforces the validity of our DID estimation.
Seventh, in Table 3 , we report a series of falsi…cation tests, in which we replace our outcome variable of interest (the amount of FDI) with seven other outcome variables that are not supposed to be a¤ected by the change in environmental regulations. The estimation results show that none of these seven DID estimates produce any statistical signi…cance and many of the estimated magnitudes are quite close to zero. The …nding that our identi…cation assumption (9) holds for these seven alternative outcome variables supports the validity of our DID estimation. 7 Finally, Table 4 reports the instrumental variable estimation results corresponding to equations (23) and (24). As shown in Column 1, the instrumental variable is found to be positive and statistically signi…cantly correlated with our regressor of interest. With respect to our central issue, the instrumented DID estimate remains negative and its magnitude is almost identical to our baseline DID estimate. However, as expected, due to the severe sample attrition problem, the standard error of the estimated instrumented DID estimate is quite large. 8 Nonetheless, the insigni…cant Dubin-Wu-Hausman test show that the instrumented DID estimate is similar to the baseline DID estimate, which implies the satisfaction of our identi…cation assumption (9) , given that the IV identi…cation assumption (25) holds.
Other Robustness Checks
In this sub-section, we conduct additional robustness checks on our aforementioned …ndings.
First, we experiment with using 1992-1995 instead of 1992-1997 as the pre-treatment period, due to concerns about the noise introduced by the preparation of the TCZ list in the 1995-1997 period. Estimation results are reported in Column 1 of Table 5 . Clearly, our main …ndings on the pollution haven e¤ect remain robust to the use of this alternative pre-treatment period.
Second, we exclude four municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin), which have higher administrative levels and hence potentially di¤erent government policies. Estimation results are reported in Column 2 of Table 5 . It is found that our DID estimate barely changes with the exclusion of these four municipalities.
Third, we exclude cities without information about the amount of FDI in 1998 because they do not have post-treatment values. Estimation results are reported in Column 3 of Table 5 . The new estimator becomes even more statistically signi…cant, which further con…rms our previous …ndings.
Finally, we exclude cities without information about the amount of FDI in the 1995-1997 period because they do not have enough pre-treatment values. As shown in Column 4 of Table 5 , our main …ndings on the pollution haven e¤ect continue to hold in this sub-sample.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether there is a pollution haven e¤ect, specifically, whether …rms respond to environmental regulations by reallocating their production to places with less stringent regulations. To control for the potential endogeneity of environmental regulations, we use a change in environmental policy, namely China's 1998 TCZ policy. Our identi…cation of the pollution haven e¤ect comes from a comparison of the outcome variable for TCZ cities with that for non-TCZ cities before and after the policy change, or the DID estimation.
By using the amount of FDI for 280 cities over the 1992-2009 period, we …nd that cities designated as TCZ attract around 41% less FDI than their non-TCZ counterparts. The results are robust to a series of robustness checks on the identi…cation assumption, along with other econometric concerns.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the pollution haven e¤ect by carefully addressing the endogeneity problem associated with environmental regulations. Meanwhile, our use of data from a developing country complements existing studies that focus more on developed countries, particularly the U.S. Note: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Note: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Note: Standard errors are clustered at city level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. Note: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Note: One-to-one matching is used to construct treatment-control pairs. Matching is based on the characteristics of each city prior to 1998 (average in 1992-97).
Appendix 1, Description of variables
